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The appropriate creation and size of local jurisdictions, as well as their 
financing system are important for achieving efficiency gains in the provi-
sion of local government goods and services. In general, one could claim 
that local provision of goods and services is useful, although in practice 
its optimal scope must be found, to efficiently combine scale and con-
gestion effects in order to minimise local authority costs (or maximise 
efficiency). Consequently, this paper has three purposes. The first one is 
to describe the organisation of local government in Slovenia. The second 
one is to describe local government financing system in Slovenia, whereas 
the third one focuses on theoretical background and empirical evidence 
of the relationship between the size of local government and its efficiency, 
where the effect of municipal size (measured in terms of population) on 
per capita municipal expenditures (unit’s costs) is examined. The paper is 
organised as follows: Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of local government 
organisation and its basic characteristics in Slovenia. Chapter 3 continues 
with the presentation of the local government financing system in Slov-
enia. Chapter 4 presents bibliography review on the local government 
formation, size and efficiency. Chapter 5 describes the empirical analysis 
on the effect of municipal size on per capita expenditures, its methodol-
ogy and main findings. The paper ends with brief concluding reflections 
and potential policy implications, and the list of references. 
Local Government System in Slovenia
Currently, there are 211 municipalities in Slovenia.1 Out of that number, 
11 are so-called urban municipalities (towns), which have a special legal 
status. Namely, they also perform tasks delegated to them by the central 
government involving town development (urbanism, etc.). Technically 
(Local Self-Government Act stipulations), municipalities with so-called 
urban status must have more than 20,000 residents, at least 15,000 jobs, 
and they should also be economic, social, and cultural centres of specific 
geographical regions, which means that they should have hospital(s), the-
1  The number of municipalities increased from 58 in 1995 to 211 in 2011. Although 
212 municipalities should exist, one municipality has not started to operate yet due to cer-
tain legal and administrative reasons. 
707
Primož Pevcin: Local Government in Slovenia: Structure, Size and Expenditures


























atres, secondary schools, that having colleges is desirable, etc.2 It is worth 
noting that there are large differences in the size of municipalities (see 
Table 1),3 and there is no intermediate level of local government (counties 
or regions). 
Table 1: Municipalities in Slovenia by the number of residents, 20094
! 
1,000 1,001–5,000 5,001–10,000 10,001–20,000 20,001–50,000
>  
50,000
Number 7 103 47 36 13 4
% of all  3,3   49,1   22,4   17,1   6,2   1,9
Source: Statistical Office of Slovenia, 2011; author’s calculations.
Moreover, data presented in Table 2 indicate that municipalities in Slov-
enia differ substantially in terms of municipal spending activities, size and 
population structure, and in economic activity. Namely, an overview of 
statistics indicates that average per capita expenditures of Slovenian mu-
nicipalities amount to "1,141 per year, although those expenditures may 
vary from "161 to " 3,911 in some municipalities. Nevertheless, statistics 
also indicates that municipalities in Slovenia differ substantially in terms 
of municipal size and population structure, and in economic activity. 
Namely, average yearly gross salary varies from approximately "8,800 to 
2  In particular, there is a special law on the capital city in Slovenia (Capital City of 
the Republic of Slovenia Act, 2004 – last amended in 2009, CCA), which stipulates that 
Ljubljana is the administrative centre of Slovenia and specifies tasks needed to ensure the 
functioning of the city serving as a capital.
3  The largest municipality has almost 280,000 residents, whereas the smallest has 
only slightly more than 300 residents (data from 2009). Legal provisions actually state that 
a municipality should have at least 5,000 inhabitants (see the Local Self-Government Act, 
LGA), although the data indicate that more than 50 per cent of existing municipalities do 
not meet that criterion. The reason for this lies in the fact that many of them tended to be 
established for political reasons or exceptionality clause on historical, economical and other 
reasons (legally) justifying the smaller size of particular municipality was often used (Oplot-
nik and Brezovnik, 2004). Besides, the same authors have also argued that cooperation and 
cost-sharing between municipalities is very small, since municipalities are not obliged (and 
consequently have no incentives) to do that.
4  The data refer to 2009, which means that all 210 municipalities are analysed, in-
cluding the capital city Ljubljana. In 2011, 211th Slovenian municipality emerged (Mirna). 
According to statistics, this municipality has approximately 1,400 residents, which is also 
below the number required by legal provisions. 
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!22,200, whereas average unemployment rate varies from 3.7 per cent to 
24 per cent. Nonetheless, there are substantial variations in the popula-
tion density (e.g., ranging from 5 to more than 1,000 residents per square 
kilometre), as well as in the share of senior citizens (e.g., ranging from 12 
per cent to almost 27 per cent of municipal population) and young popu-
lation, which altogether supports the thesis of considerable differences 
between municipalities. 
Table 2: An overview of basic characteristics of Slovenian municipalities, 
2009
Mean Min Max
Total municipal expenditures per capita (!)   1,141 161   3,911
Average gross salary per annum (!)  15,114   8,820  22,287
Average unemployment rate (%)   9.8   3.7  24.0
Population (in 1,000)   9.725   0.320 278.314
Population density per squared km 113   5   1,019
Share of population above 65 (%)  16.47  12.06  26.89
Share of population below 15 (%)  14.41   8.21  20.78
Source: Statistical Office of Slovenia (2011), Ministry of Finance (2011), author’s calcula-
tions.
The System of Municipal Financing in Slovenia
According to the LGA (2007), municipalities perform local tasks of pub-
lic interest in order to meet the needs of their residents. Specifically, 
municipalities manage the municipal assets and organise municipal ad-
ministration, develop conditions for economic development of the mu-
nicipality, provide spatial development plans and create conditions for 
housing, manage and regulate local public utilities and the provision of 
local public services, provide social services (in particular pre-school and 
primary school education, social, cultural and recreational activities etc.), 
maintain local roads, fire safety etc. Table 3 summarises expenditures of 
Slovenian municipalities by function. 
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Public order  1.9
Public utilities 23.4
Environment protection  9.3
Housing and spatial development  8.1
Health care  0.7
Recreation, culture and activities of NGO’s 10.9
Education 21.7
Social security  4.6
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011) and author’s calculations.
In contrast, municipalities in Slovenia obtain their money from tax rev-
enues, non-tax revenues, capital revenues, donations, transfers and EU 
funds. Specifically, Act on Local Finances (2008, ALF) stipulates that 
municipalities finance their activities from four major groups of revenues 
– their own tax revenues (revenues from inheritance and gift taxes, prop-
erty taxes, taxes on real estate business transactions, shared 54% of per-
sonal income tax paid by municipal residents,5 etc.); other municipal rev-
enues (administrative fees and duties, concession duties and municipal 
communal rates, environmental duties, revenues from the management 
of municipal property, donations, transfers from the central budget, etc.); 
municipal duties (i.e., compensation fees for the use of municipal land, 
etc.); and borrowing (the amount is limited by law). 
5  In fact, shared personal income tax is the single most important revenue source for 
municipalities. According to administrative and legal provisions, the appropriate amount of 
income tax is weekly transferred to municipalities from the central budget.
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Table 4: Consolidated revenues of municipalities in Slovenia, 2009 (per-
centage, borrowing and financial investments excluded)
Tax revenues 63.6
Non-tax revenues 12.5
Capital revenues  4.8
Donations  0.2
Transfers 18.8
EU funds  0.1
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011) and author’s calculations.
The ALF (1998) introduced a system of appropriate expenditure in or-
der to allow municipalities to carry out their constitutional and legal re-
sponsibilities. According to this system, last amended in 2007 fiscal year 
(ALF, 2006),6 appropriate expenditure is calculated on the basis of a spe-
cial equation, which includes correctional factors for diversity in munici-
palities for the purpose of achieving equalisations (compared to national 
average), such as the size of municipality, the number of residents, the 
number of residents aged below 15 and above 65 and the length of local 
roads. Specifically, the formula for calculation of the appropriate expen-
ditures is as follows:
6  Basically, the model of calculation of i-th municipality’s appropriate expenditure 
has been amended in the sense that weights of correctional factors have been changed and 
the average municipal costs per capita needed for financing of their tasks has been intro-
duced as a basis for appropriate expenditure calculation. Several problems of the old system 
were the reasons for amending the act. For instance, the old system of financing pressures 
for the establishment of new municipalities, since the system was particularly in favour of 
smaller municipalities as the principle of financial equalisation provided reasonable financial 
sources for economically disadvantaged municipalities, too (Rop, 2006). Moreover, finan-
cial equalisation caused disincentive effects on the mobilisation of municipal own revenues, 
and it also provided disincentive effects on the promotion of developmental issues in munici-
palities (Government Office of Local Self-Government and Regional Development, 2006). 
Consequently, municipalities’ financial autonomy almost disappeared, and the aim of the 
amendments was to reduce the dependency of municipalities on financial equalisation in 
order to achieve their greater autonomy. Finally, there were relatively large differences in 
appropriate expenditure valuation between municipalities, combined with relatively large 
dependency on resources derived from income tax. This has ultimately led to the existence 
of overspending bias. 
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PPi = (0.61 + 0.13*Ci + 0.06*Pi + 0.16*Mi + 0.04*Si)*P*Oi,
where PPi is appropriate expenditures of municipality, Ci is the ratio be-
tween the per capita length of local roads in an individual municipality 
and the per capita length of local roads in Slovenia, Pi is the ratio between 
the per capita surface area of an individual municipality and the per capita 
surface area of Slovenia, Mi is the ratio between the share of population 
under the age of 15 in the population of an individual municipality and 
the average share for municipalities in Slovenia, Si is the ratio between 
the share of persons over the age of 65 in the entire population of an indi-
vidual municipality and the average share for municipalities in Slovenia, P 
is average expenditures per capita (necessary funds to perform legal and 
constitutional tasks, determined each fiscal year), and Oi is the number of 
residents in the municipality.7
The LGA (2007) stipulates that municipalities must raise their own rev-
enues.8 Financially disadvantaged municipalities, unable to fully perform 
their duties, are eligible to receive additional financial assistance from 
the state in accordance with the principles and criteria prescribed by law. 
This actually means that municipalities, where their own resources may 
not be sufficient to finance the provision of services that a municipality 
is obliged to deliver, are eligible to receive special financial equalisation 
from the central government budget.9 There are both economic and so-
cial rationales for introducing financial equalisation, such as the relatively 
small size of municipalities, limited scope for user-charging due to the po-
tentially negative social impacts and high collection costs, not to mention 
the directives of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985, 
7  This formula is determined (calculated) by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for each 
fiscal year.
8  Besides, the Law also prescribes the appropriate revenues of a municipality in order 
to finance its appropriate expenditures. These revenues are the basis for determination of the 
amount of shared personal income tax eligible for certain municipality, and are determined 
by the MoF for each fiscal year. Specifically, appropriate revenues of the municipality are 
determined with equation Gli = Oi*Gl*(0.3 + 0.7* Iro), where Gli represents appropriate 
revenues of the municipality, Oi is the number of residents in the municipality, Gl is average 
appropriate expenditures per capita, and Iro is the index of municipal diversity (calculated 
with the formula Iro= PPi/ (Oi*Gl)). Moreover, municipalities may use extra revenues if Gli 
exceeds PPi, yet the limitation exists if Gli exceed PPi by more than 15 per cent – in that 
case, only 50 per cent of extra money can be used by the municipality.
9  Put differently, municipalities with insufficient municipal revenues to finance mu-
nicipal appropriate expenditures, receive additional revenues in order to be able to perform 
their duties (see ALF, 2008). Mathematically, this means that Gli is less than PPi (see 
previous footnote).
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ECLSG), whose Article 9 supports the institution of financial equalisation 
that ought to correct the effects of unequal distribution of potential fi-
nancial sources and burdens of local authorities.10 On aggregate, financial 
equalisation amounted to approximately !54 million in 2009, which is not 
much when compared to total revenues of municipalities, although 191 
municipalities received that kind of central government support (Ministry 
of Finance, 2010).11
Literature on Local Government Size and 
Efficiency
Oates (2005) has summarised that there are two distinct generations of 
fiscal federalism theories. The first-generation theories basically envisaged 
that local governments should have competitive advantage in the provi-
sion of local public goods.12 Among several first-generation approaches, 
two most important should be stressed.13 First approach is based on Tie-
bout’s (1956) theory, which is based on the premise of “voting with feet”, 
meaning that voters select local jurisdiction where their individual pref-
erences in tax and service mix are best met. In this context, this should 
induce competition between local jurisdictions for taxpayers and finally 
result in more efficient provision of public services. The second approach 
is based on the competing theory and states that excess fragmentation of 
government leads to inefficiencies in the provision of local public serv-
10  More on the financial equalisation see also Bailey (1999).
11  The new system substantially decreased the number of municipalities receiving 
financial equalisation as well as the total amount of financial equalisation. Namely, through-
out the period 1999-2006, the number of self-financed municipalities substantially de-
creased, and consequently only 17 municipalities did not receive financial equalisation in 
2006, which amounted to almost !190 million according to the MoF (2010) data. The sud-
den increase in the number of municipalities receiving financial equalisation in 2009 could 
be in part attributed to the economic slowdown, which was particularly severe in Slovenia. 
Namely, municipal financing largely depends on income tax as a revenue source and this tax 
has very important cyclical component.
12  Nevertheless, this theory still recognises the competitive advantage of central gov-
ernment in the provision of national public goods as well as in the implementation of redis-
tributive and stabilisation policies. Actually, the main focus of the research in those theories 
was on the assignment of functions to the different levels of government.
13  It should be stressed that the hypotheses of the first-generation theories are much 
broader as they, e.g., also analyse the issues of local taxation, hard budget constraints etc. 
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ices, such as various duplications, problems in achieving economies of 
scale etc.14 In short, this view can be put in the context of Oates’ (1972) 
decentralisation theorem, which states that the trade-off of decentralised 
government structure is between lost economies of scale and problems 
with internalisation of externalities and spill-over effects on the one hand, 
and better matching of services levels to preferences on the other.15 
Nevertheless, the first generation theories neglected the important con-
tributions to the theories of fiscal federalism developed by public choice 
theory. These contributions mainly concentrate on the behaviour of poli-
ticians and political process as well as on the problems of information 
(Oates, 2005).16 For instance, the models have dealt with the issues of 
political accountability at the local level (Seabright, 1996), differences in 
preferences of median voters across local jurisdictions (Besley and Coate, 
2003),17 forms of fiscal decentralisation (Rodden, 2006),18 etc. 
Regarding the outlines of first-generation approaches, local provision of 
goods and services should have both advantages and disadvantages. Spe-
cifically, the literature portrays several potential advantages of local pro-
14  In fact, the main differences between two approaches, according to Garzarelli’s 
(2004) taxonomy, are related to the use of organisational approach and application of mo-
tivation for federalism – second-generation theories should use organisational approach in 
the analysis, and both knowledge and incentives should represent main motivation for fed-
eralism.
15  Specifically, Konishi (2009) contemplates that centralisation is more viable if the 
efficiency gains from internalisation of cross-jurisdictional spill-overs outweigh the losses 
from uniform policy-making.
16  See the author for the comprehensive overview of the theories.
17  For instance, those two authors have argued that centralised structure of govern-
ment is preferred when the public good preferences of the median voter are similar across 
local jurisdictions and spill-over effects are large.
18  In fact, Rodden (2006) has argued in his revision of Hamilton’s paradox that a 
negative effect of decentralised government finance is associated with the moral hazard 
problem, which is even inflated if sub-national governments are funded primarily through 
revenue-sharing and grants. In this case, centre dominates the power to tax and takes on 
heavy obligations on funding of sub-national governments, which causes that officials of sub-
national governments face weak incentives for fiscal discipline. The author also argues that 
the real problem of local government finance is in fact semi-sovereignty with political centre 
dominating taxation but not local government spending and borrowing. Actually, the anal-
ogy is taken from the theory of the firm and the theory of soft budget constraints in socialist 
economies: more autonomy of state-owned companies’ managers without the reduction of 
reliance on government funding increases the soft budget constraints problem; in the hold-
ing company each division manager trades votes with other division managers for favoured 
projects, which causes cross-subsidisation and inflates common resource problem.
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vision of goods and services. For instance, local provision of goods and 
services should contribute to greater prosperity, as it (Pareto efficiently) 
decreases the deadweight loss of the consumer surplus (Bailey, 1999). 
The reason for greater efficiency also lies in the better knowledge and 
subsequent greater ability to fulfil diverse preferences. Moreover, the so-
called “geographical proximity effect” states that the level of information 
on production costs of public goods and services is higher at the local 
level, and at the same time, the variance of marginal costs of public goods 
and services has a negative correlation with the size of local authorities 
(Gilbert and Picard, 1996), which should result in greater efficiency of 
local goods and services provision. Finally, voters’ political participation 
should be larger at the local level (Borck, 2002). The reason for this lies 
in the fact that at the local level, individual voters have greater influence 
on the outcome of the political decision-making because their votes carry 
relatively more weight. Consequently, greater political participation im-
plicitly results in greater political accountability of the local authorities, as 
the voters’ control over the politicians in increased.19 In fact, Eichenberg-
er (1994) has summarised that the main advantages associated with local 
provision of goods and services are better fulfilment of locally differing 
preferences, lower planning and administrative costs related to possibility 
of bureaucracy reduction, greater organisational and political innovations 
due to smallness, and greater competition as well as greater efficiency in 
politics as citizens tend to have more influence.
In contrast, local provision of goods and services can have several disad-
vantages. As already mentioned the main drawback of local provision lies 
in the potentially lost economies of scale (Bailey, 1999). Namely, in cen-
tralised provision, economies of scale are supposed to be created due to 
the possibility of production specialisation, as well as of lower administra-
tive costs.20 Besides, the problem of spill-over effects and their internali-
sation are associated with local provision, which is typical for goods and 
services with important spatial externalities (e.g., health care and tertiary 
education). Local authorities are often unable to perceive the positive ef-
fects, meaning that they do not take them into account when making de-
cisions.21 Finally, if the financing of local provision of goods and services 
19  More on this issue: Seabright (1996).
20  The economies of scale are particularly relevant to infrastructure intensive activi-
ties, such as, for example, water and sewerage (Fox and Gurley, 2006).
21  See Gilbert and Picard (1996) on this issue.
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is (at least partially) based on revenue-sharing or grants received, local 
governments have the incentive to overextend the supply of services, since 
they do not have to bear full costs (Eichenberger, 1994).22
Taking into account the premises of first-generation fiscal federalism the-
ories, the literature on fiscal federalism is also interested into the optimal 
size of local jurisdictions.23 Typically, the research focuses on both costs 
and on the performance of local jurisdictions, and the discussion is based 
on the notion that the optimal size of the local unit is determined as 
a balance between service provision costs and congestion effects (Bises 
and Sacchi, 2009).24 Specifically, this notion was derived from the club 
theory: the size of the local jurisdiction and welfare of the resident of 
that jurisdiction are both positively and negatively related. Namely, the 
larger size of local jurisdiction also denotes the larger number of taxpay-
ers, which decreases the per capita costs of public services provision, yet it 
also causes crowding problems. In particular, goods and services that are 
typically provided by local governments (e.g., education, public transport 
etc.) tend to have significant crowding effects. 
In fact, Holzer et al. (2009) have argued that the non-linear relationship 
exists between the size of local jurisdictions and their performance, since 
too large jurisdictions experience diseconomies of scale and too small 
jurisdictions are not able to achieve economies of scale.25 In particular, 
economies of scale are persistent in capital-intensive services of local ju-
risdictions, those being, for example, water provision and maintenance 
of rural roads, meaning that larger local government units can provide 
them more efficiently. In contrast, smaller local government units deliver 
labour-intensive services more efficiently (for example, police and fire 
22  Furthermore, more centralised provision of goods and services should allow their 
better coordination, not to mention the fact that at least minimal provision of certain public 
goods and services can be guaranteed. 
23  Although the discussion follows outlines of Oates (2005) approach, readers should 
acknowledge that there are some other approaches to fiscal federalism (e.g., public choice 
approach, political economics approach etc.). More on this issue see Garzarelli (2004).
24  In technical terms, the size of local jurisdictions is typically measured in terms of 
population.
25  They point out that the most efficient size of local jurisdictions is in the range of 
population from 25 thousand to 250 thousand.
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protection, refuse collection, public education etc.), since those services 
do not exhibit significant economies of scale.26 
Nonetheless, the theory predicts for different potential effects of local gov-
ernment size on its costs (performance): linear negative effect, linear posi-
tive effect, non-linear U-shaped effect and non-linear inverted U-shaped 
effect (see Andrews et al., 2006). In the first case, bigger local government 
means lower costs, which could be attributed to either economics of scale 
or larger strategic capacity. In the second case, bigger local government 
means higher costs, which could be attributed to possible bureaucratic 
congestions.27 In the third case, the costs of local government units fall at 
the beginning, but start to rise after certain size of local government has 
been achieved. This means that the costs of medium-sized local units are 
the lowest, which could be attributed to acquired economics of scale, but 
congestion effects have not been experienced yet. This implies that there 
is an optimal size of local units, which can be achieved with amalgamation 
of smaller and disaggregation of larger units. Finally, the last case shows 
that costs of medium-sized local units are the highest, which could be at-
tributed to the fact that they have not experienced the economies of scale 
yet, but they still experience congestion effects. 
Research Design and Findings
The main purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence about 
the effect of local governments’ size on their costs (expenditures) for a 
cross-section of 210 Slovenian municipalities. Based on the empirical lit-
erature review (e.g., Briem, 1998), the estimated regression model for 
local government expenditure function uses per capita municipal total 
expenditures as dependent variable, whereas the inclusion of explana-
tory variables in the model is based on the hypotheses of standard litera-
ture addressing this issue. Specifically, explanatory variables used in the 
analysis are: Population (total municipal population in 1,000 in order to 
validate the effect of the size of local government units on the municipal 
26  It should be noted that the literature points out that, on average, over 80 per cent 
of local jurisdiction services are of labour-intensive and routine nature (Katsuyama, 2003). 
Accordingly, the author stresses that allocative issues, such as management of resources, are 
more important than technical efficiencies, such as economies of scale.
27  This means that viable policy option in the first case is local government amalgama-
tion, whereas in the second case disaggregation of larger local government units. 
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expenditures per capita);28 Wealth (per capita income, which relates to 
idea that available income should be the other important prerequisite for 
municipal spending: average yearly gross salary per employed person in 
i-th municipality is used as proxy for describing per capita income, since 
those data are available at the municipal level);29 Grants (per capita mu-
nicipal transfer revenues, since they tend to be another important source 
for financing municipal spending - transfer revenues (grants) considered 
in the analysis are those received from the central budget as well as from 
other public funds and agencies, including possible financial equalisa-
tion); Core services (variable describing expenditures; needs to control 
the ability of municipality to meet the demands for local public goods 
provision – basically, the costs of administrative operation, public utilities 
and education are used as a proxy for describing the core functions of the 
municipality, and they are all expressed in per capita terms);30 Density 
(municipal population per squared kilometre of territory, which describes 
the density of population in i-th municipality in order to control poten-
tial effects of dispersed population); Unemployment rate (proportion of 
population unemployed (registered unemployment rate based on the Na-
tional Labour Office’s methodology); The old (proportion of population 
in the municipality above 65 years of age; and The young (proportion of 
population in the municipality below 15 years of age).31
28  Moreover, the empirical analysis also utilises squared term for the variable in order 
to test potential non-linear effects.
29  Nonetheless, other similar studies report that using either average salary or per 
capita local GDP would lead to similar results (see Blume and Blume, 2007), which indi-
cates that it is viable to use each of those covariates in the analysis.
30  Those three types of expenditures are namely the most important expenditures 
of municipalities in Slovenia, since the provision of those services and functions is in the 
municipal domain.
31  The last three variables, that is Unemployment rate, The old and The young, are 
included in the analysis to control for group-specific demands, predominantly of those popu-
lation groups that have relatively larger demand for public spending. These control variables 
are integrated into the model, since the majority of them are usually standard in the empiri-
cal literature estimating local government expenditure functions (e.g., see Worthington and 
Dollery, 1999; Saruc and Sagbas, 2008). For instance, the exposition given in Worthington 
and Dollery (1999) specifies expenditure function for governmentally provided goods as 
the function of the total amount of resources that are available for funding such expendi-
tures, the function of the relative tax price of expenditures, and the function of institutional 
and other factors that affect expenditure outcomes. The source for variables Expenditures, 
Grants and Core services is the Ministry of Finance (2011), whereas the Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Slovenia (2011) is data source for the variables Population, Wealth, Density, 
Unemployment rate, The old and The young. All the data are from 2009.
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Table 5: Municipalities in Slovenia – size and expenditures (costs)32
Estimation
Linear population term only Squared population term included
(1) (2) with control  variables (3)
(4) with control  
variables
Constant 1155.04 (35.06) 515.693 (181.852) 1190.96 (45.84) 505.817 (182.120)
Population -1.401 (0.941) -1.707 (0.778) -6.352 (3.076) -0.757 (1.804)
Population^2 / / 0.022 (0.011) -0.004 (0.005)
Wealth / 0.012 (0.007) / 0.011 (0.007)
Grants / 0.588 (0.143) / 0.592 (0.146)
Core services / 0.848 (0.146) / 0.848 (0.148)
Density / 0.491 (0.184) / 0.473 (0.191)
Unempl. rate / -8.583 (3.093) / -8.419 (3.124)
The young / -21.137 (8.517) / -20.596 (8.595)
Observations 210 210 210 210
R2adj. 0.000 0.867 0.005 0.867
St. error of est. 453.549 165.163 452.317 165.399
Durbin-Watson 2.358 1.814 2.350 1.833
F-stat. 0.945 196.232 1.542 171.266
Reset p 0.146 0.285 0.085 0.277
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 5 presents ordinary least squares estimations for the municipal ex-
penditures’ function.33 Columns 1 and 3 present the effect of population 
on municipal costs per capita without using any control variables. Inter-
estingly, calculations indicate that there is a negative effect of municipal 
size on per capita expenditures (column 1), although this effect is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, if squared term of population variable 
is added to the model, calculations indicate that there occurs non-linear 
U-shaped effect of population size on municipal expenditures per capita, 
implying that there should exist an optimal size of municipality. Nonethe-
less, two points should be addressed in relation to this hypothesis. First 
of all, if the derivative of squared function is calculated, results reveal that 
32  White HC standard errors are shown in parentheses due to the revealed presence 
of heteroscedasticity.
33  It needs to be stressed that variable The old is left out of the model (columns 2 and 
4), since the χ2 test has shown that this variable tends to be redundant.
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curve starts to rise after a relatively large size of municipality is achieved,34 
which means that in practice only the negative effect could be observed 
given the relatively small size of municipalities. Second, the results also 
indicate that control variables are needed, since the characteristics of 
both »reduced« models seem to be very poor as they are not statistically 
significant. 
Consequently, columns 2 and 4 show »appropriate« expenditure func-
tions for Slovenian municipalities by incorporating relevant control vari-
ables based on hypotheses derived from literature review. The model de-
scribed in column 2 uses only linear population term, whereas the model 
described in column 4 uses quadratic (squared) population term as well, 
thus enabling us to test the potential non-linear effect of municipal size on 
unit’s costs. Interestingly, both estimates suggest that almost nine tenths 
of variation in per capita total expenditures (i.e., unit’s costs) of Slovenian 
municipalities could be explained with seven explanatory variables, which 
is a relatively good result, since cross-sectional data are used. Further-
more, both estimated models seem to be structurally stable. The evidence 
of linear estimation suggests that a statistically significant negative ef-
fect of the size on total per capita expenditures could be observed, which 
argues in favour of the presence of economies of scale, since increase in 
the size of the municipality obviously causes reduction in expenditures 
per capita, although the effect tends to be relatively small.35 Moreover, 
if quadratic term is used in the analysis, both population covariates seem 
to be highly statistically insignificant, which means that any non-linear 
relationship (effect) between municipal size and per capita expenditures 
should be reasonably excluded. 
Regarding the effect of other explanatory variables on total per capita ex-
penditures of Slovenian municipalities (column 2), the majority of control 
variables (Grants, Core services, Density and Unemployment) seem to 
be statistically significant at 99 per cent level, whereas variable The young 
is statistically significant at 95 per cent level. Interestingly, the regres-
sion coefficient of variables Grants, Core services and Density has the ex-
pected positive sign, which means that per capita municipal expenditures 
are positively affected by grants received (i.e., »stickiness« of intergov-
34  Turning point occurs at roughly 260,000 residents and more.
35  Interestingly, the negative magnitude of the effect even increased when control 
variables were included.
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ernmental transfers),36 implementation of core functions and rising den-
sity of population cause potential problems associated with congestion. 
In contrast, regression coefficient of variables Unemployment and The 
young has the unexpected negative sign, which is not in line with theoreti-
cal predictions. Finally, the impact of wealth on municipal expenditures 
is problematic if statistical significance (95 per cent level) is taken into 
account, suggesting limited dependence of municipal spending on per-
capita income.37 
Concluding Remarks
The aim of the paper is to give insight into local government system in 
Slovenia. There is only one tier of local government in Slovenia (i.e., mu-
nicipalities), and data indicate that municipalities differ substantially in 
their size, spending activities, and in other socio-economic characteristics. 
The empirical research presented in the paper suggests that the negative 
effect of the size on total per capita expenditures of Slovenian munici-
palities could be observed, which means that an increase in the size of 
municipality obviously causes reduction in expenditures per capita. Given 
the fact that municipalities ought to perform legally defined tasks, this 
would suggest that the amalgamation of municipalities would possibly 
lead to lower per capita expenditures, although calculations indicate that 
very large reductions in unit costs should not be expected. Those findings 
are partially in line with previous research for Slovenia (see the overview in 
Oplotnik and Brezovnik, 2004), where the analyses showed that smaller 
municipalities confront larger expenditure for public administration and 
spacious rural municipalities tended to be more expensive for economic 
activities.38 Nonetheless, this study concentrated on total per capita ex-
penditures, and negative effect of the size on spending levels has been 
pointed out for those expenditures, although variations may exist regard-
ing the particular types of expenditures (e.g., according to functional clas-
sification). Consequently, the research could be potentially extended if 
36  See, for example, Pevcin (2011) on theoretical and practical aspects of this issue.
37  The problem of insufficient relations between municipal expenditures and rev-
enues in Slovenia has already been addressed by Oplotnik and Brezovnik (2004).
38  Yet, the analyses showed that larger municipalities, in contrast, confront higher 
expenditures for communal activities, housing etc.
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the effect of size on specific types of expenditures is analysed, although 
the effect on total expenditures is still practically the most important one. 
Namely, the differences in results for various types of expenditures would 
suggest different suitable (appropriate) municipal size for each activity, 
which is often not a viable option in practice. 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SLOVENIA:  
STRUCTURE, SIZE AND EXPENDITURES
Summary
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the relationship between local govern-
ment size and costs (expenditures) in Slovenia. There is only one tier of local 
government in Slovenia. Municipalities differ substantially in their size, spend-
ing activities and in other socio-economic characteristics. Consequently, this 
gives opportunity to assess the relation and the effect of size on per capita ex-
penditures of municipalities, which could be either linear (positive, negative) or 
non-linear (U-shaped, inverted U-shaped). The empirical evidence suggests that 
linear negative effect of municipal size on per capita expenditures of Slovenian 
municipalities could be observed, which means that findings speak in favour of 
policy implications that foster municipal amalgamation.
Key words: local authority, local government finances, municipal expenditures, 
optimal municipal size, Slovenia
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LOKALNA SAMOUPRAVA U SLOVENIJI:  
STRUKTURA, VELI!INA I RASHODI
Sa"etak
Svrha rada je istra"iti odnos izme#u veli$ine lokalnih jedinica i njihovih tro%kova 
odnosno rashoda u Sloveniji. Samo je jedan stupanj lokalne samouprave u Slov-
eniji, a jedinice se zna$ajno razlikuju prema veli$ini, aktivnostima koje finan-
ciraju i drugim socioekonomskim karakteristikama. Takva situacija omogu&uje 
da se ocijeni odnos i u$inak veli$ine na rashode jedinica lokalne samouprave 
po glavi stanovnika, koji mo"e biti linearan (pozitivan ili negativan) ili nelin-
earan (u obliku U krivulje ili obrnute U krivulje). Empirijski podaci pokazuju 
da postoji linearan negativan u$inak veli$ine lokalne jedinice na rashode po 
glavi stanovnika u Sloveniji. Rezultati, dakle, govore u prilog politici poticanja 
spajanja manjih lokalnih jedinica u ve&e. 
Klju!ne rije!i: lokalna vlast, lokalne financije, rashodi lokalnih samoupravnih 
jedinica, optimalna veli$ina lokalne jedinice, Slovenija 
